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The Economics Department hosted a
panel discussion on Wednesday, October
27, exploring the current recession, the
stimulus program and the tipid nature of
the current expansion.
The panel, chaired by Mayo Toruño,
consisted of Professors Parviz Asheghian,
Jim Charkins, Eric Nilsson, and Thomas
Pierce.
All agreed that the most recent recession, from December of 2007 until June
of 2009, was the most severe since the
Great Depression of the 1930s. It was also
agreed that the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the official

name of the Federal Government stimulus
package) was not as stimulative as it should
have been, and that the Fed’s expansionary
monetary policy, while appropriate and
necessary, has run up against the classic
liquidity trap problem.
The first panelist, Dr. Parviz Asheghian,
offered the audience a brief history of the
1930s Great Depression, reminding us of
the fact that it wasn’t until the U.S. entered
World War II that the economy rebounded.
The unprecedented fiscal stimulus provided
by the Federal Government’s war-related
deficit spending dramatically reduced the
unemployment rate while setting the stage
continued on page 2

Economics Panel, from left to right: Mayo Toruño, Parviz Asheghian, Eric Nilsson, Jim Charkins, Thomas Pierce.

Econ Radicals!!
Department of Economics
CSUSB
909-537-5511
http://economics.csusb.edu
Facebook: CSUSB Department of
Economics

The new president of the Econ Radicals, the Economics Student Club, is Adam Elway.
The Econ Radicals take their name from a desire to go to the root of injustice and
explore ways to improve the human condition. The purpose and aims of the Econ Radicals are: (1) to promote interest in economics within academia and on a societal level;
(2) to provide students an environment in which to explore past, present and future
economic issues, beyond the confines of academia; (3) to inform students of career options and upcoming events that may be useful in career planning; (4) to design products, plan guest speaker seminars, and organize field trips; and (5), contribute to the
community through volunteerism.
The Econ Radicals are on Facebook. If you would like to join the Econ Radicals,
please email “econradicals@gmail.com”
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Continued from page 1
for the prosperity of the post-war era,
the Golden Age of American capitalism from the end of World War II until
the early 1970s.
Professor Asheghian noted that
there are interesting parallels between
the era of the Great Depression and the
current time period. For example, in
both eras inccome and wealth inequality grew dramatically in the decades
leading up to the economic contraction, contributing to the speculative
bubbles that preceeded both contractions.
Dr. Jim Charkins laid out the economic facts of the current recession,
highlighting the fact that this is easily
the most severe recession the U.S. has
experienced since the Great Depression.

...this is easily the most
severe recession the U.S. has
experienced since the Great
Depression.
Gross domestic product (GDP)
declined more dramatically than at any
point in the post-World War II era. In
addition, not only has this been the
longest recession since World War II
(lasting 18 months) it brought about
the greatest decline in employment –
approximately 8 million jobs– while
increasing the average duration of
unemployment to 35 months (the net
highest average duration of unemploy-

ment was a little over 20 months in
early1983).
Finally, home prices (as measured
by the Case-Shiller home price index)
have fallen more dramatically in the
current cycle than at any point since
the early 1980s (when the Case-Shiller
index was first developed). Similar

...as macroeconomic students
know, the tax multiplier is
smaller than the government
spending multiplier.
housing data going back to the 1970s is
consistent with this observation.  
While the National Bureau of
Economic Analysis has declared the
recession formally over, the evidence
suggests that unemployment will remain high for a few more years.  
Dr. Eric Nilsson summarized the
impact of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act by noting that despite
its price tag, $787 billion, the effect was
not as strong as it could have been.
The reason is simple: 40% of the
stimulus spending consisted of tax cuts
rather than direct government spending; and as macroeconomic students
know, the tax multiplier is smaller than
the government spending multiplier.
Although it was weaker than it could
have been, the stimulus program did
save approximately 2.4 million jobs and,
so, was a good thing.

Dr. Thomas Pierce, closed out the
discussion by explaining the actions of
the Federal Reserve System (the Fed)
during the most recession.
He noted that the Fed carried out
an unprecedented volume and variety
of stimulative monetary policies with
the intention of not only stabilizing the
financial sector but, at the same time,
providing the context for the increased
spending which lower interest rates are
supposed to prompt.
As a result of the Feds policies shortterm interest rates are at historic lows
(essentially zero for the Federal Funds
rate and in the 4.5% range for 30-year,
fixed, mortgages). Yet, in a context of
extremely weak aggregate demand (due
to the enormous number of unemployed people), motivating people and
businesses to spend – even when interest rates are low – is very difficult.

We’re on
Facebook !!
Don’t forget to check us out on
Facebook and say that you like us!
You can find the economics department at The CSUSB Department of
Economics Facebook page. Joining us
on Facebook is an important way of
keeping up with departmental news
and events as well as getting information on political economy.

Staying Informed about CSUSB Department of
Economics Events and News
If you’re receiving the Coyote Economist, then you’re on our mailing list and everything is as it should be. But, if you
know of an Economics Major, or an Econ Fellow Traveler, who is not receiving the Coyote Economist through email, then
please have him/her inform our Administrative Support Coordinator, Ms. Jacqueline Carrillo, or the Chair of the Economics Department, Professor Mayo Toruño. Our phone number is 909-537-5511.
You can stay informed by consulting:
Our Website - http://economics.csusb.edu/
Our Facebook Page- http://www.facebook.com/pages/CSUSB-Department-of-Economics/109500729082841
Chair of the Economics Department – mtoruno@csusb.edu
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Deficit Spending and Belt Tightening
The last ten months have witnessed
increased concern over deficit spending and the growing public debt.
While these concerns are most
frequently voiced by right-wing politicians, they’re now being expressed by
political centrists and the mainstream
media.
Thus, this past February, President
Obama signed an executive order
establishing the National Comission
on Fiscal Responsibilty and Reform,
whose mission is to balance the Federal Government’s budget, excluding
interest payments on the debt, by 2015.
The commission’s report is due December 1, and will more than likely be
used by President Obama to propose
belt tightening measures at his upcoming 2011 State of the Union message.
This is unfortunate because this
is exactly the opposite of what the
government should be doing at this
time. Rather than reducing the size of
the deficit, the government should be
increasing it through direct governemt
spending to reduce the suffering and
economic waste brought on by unemployment.
But the problem is that pleads for
government belt tightening resonate
with an electorate that’s experiencing
economic hardship.

...government borrowing will
take up the slack left by the
decline in private borrowing.
A common refrain is that government should learn to live within its
means; governments, so it’s believed,
should not be spend more than they
collect in taxes, especially at a time
when the average household is being
forced to live with less.
While these sentiments have an air of
common-sense fairness, accounting for
their populist appeal, they’re riddled
with contradictions and logical fallacies.

Here we’ll focus on only one version
of this belt-tightening argument; the
claim that deficit spending has little to
no stimulative impact because it leads
to a reduction in private spending.
At least two versions of this argument exist, but the one that’s most
common among conservative economists is that deficit spending causes
interest rates to rise (as a result of the
increased public borrowing) which
in turn causes investment spending,
consumption spending and net exports
to fall.

...it’s important to remember
that in the current recession
interest rates are at a historic
low
In the extreme, this argument
claims that the reduction in private
spending will counterbalance the
increase in public spending, negating
thereby the stimulative impact of the
deficit.
The only time such an argument
might have merit would be in the
context of full employment, in which
case deficit spending is unnecessary
anyway. But, in a context of considerable unemployment, government borrowing will be financed by the excess
saving that’s not being absorbed by the
private sector.
Rather than displacing private borrowing, government borrowing will
take up the slack left by the decline in
private borrowing. The impact on interest rates will be slight. In addition, the
increased economic activity brought
on by the government’s deficit spending will have the effect of inducing
firms to add to their productive capacity by increasing investment spending.
This can occur even if interest rates
were to rise (since investment spending depends on the difference between
the expected rate of profit and the
3

interest rate, it will increase if expected
profitability rates grow faster than
intereste rates).
Thus, deficit spending, rather than
crowding out private investment
through rising interest rates, will
actually induce investment spending
through the rising profit expectations
made possible by the growth in aggregate demand brought on by government deficit spending. What’s more, as
the economy grows and incomes begin
to expand, so too will the flow of saving which will put further downward
pressure on interest rates.
But, in addition to the above, it’s
important to remember that in the
current recession interest rates are at a
historic low as a result of the Fed’s aggresive monetary policy.

...it’s exactly the opposite of
what the government should be
doing at this time.
Thus, government can borrow at
much lower rates than was possible
at the beginning of the recession. The
private saving that is not being channeled into productive activity can be
borrowed by the government for deficit spending, without puting upward
pressure on interest rates.
This will stimulate the economy
and induce investment spending (as
well as consumption spending and net
exports), causing GDP and employment to grow.
Once the economy comes back
to full employment, the deficit, as a
proportion of GDP, will decline of
it’s own accord. The growing level
of income and employment, made
possible by aggressive fiscal and
monetary policy, will have the effect
of increasing the flow of tax revenues
which, with a given level of government spending, will cause the deficit
to shrink over time.

Econ 390: Origins of Political Economy
In Winter 2011 the Economics Department will be teaching a special topics course: Economics 390, Origins of Political
Economy. This course will consider in detail the economic and social theories of Karl Marx and the intellectual, political,
and economic environment that caused these theories to appear.
In the future, the material appearing in this special topics course will be taught  in a new course, Economics 443 (Origins of Political Economy). The already-existing Economics 445 (Political Economy) will be transformed to focus on 20th
and 21st century developments in Marxian economic and social theory.

Tentative Spring 2011 Schedule of Classes
#	 SEC
200
02
372
01
202
02
200
01
202
01
200
03
202
03
450
01
200
04
202
04
490
01
500
01
410
01
200
05
360
01
311
01
445
01

TITLE			
PRIN MICROECON
BUSINESS CYCLES
PRIN MACROECON
PRIN MICROECON
PRIN MACROECON
PRIN MICROECON
PRIN MACROECON
GLOBAL ECONOMY
PRIN MICROECON
PRIN MACROECON
ECONOMETRICS
HIST ECON IDEAS
MONEY & BANKING
PRIN MICROECON
ENVIRO ECON
ECON K-8		
POLITICAL ECON

HOURS	 	
0400-0550
PM
0400-0550
PM
0600-0750
PM
0920-1030
AM
1040-1150
AM
1000-1150
AM
1000-1150
AM
1000-1150
AM
0200-0350
PM
0200-0350
PM
0200-0350
PM
0400-0550
PM
0600-0750
PM
0600-0750
PM
0800-0750
PM
1200-0150
PM
1200-0150
PM

DAYS
MW
MW
MW
MWF
MWF
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR
TR

INSTRUCTOR
PEREZ-MARES
HARRIS
JORGENSEN
HARRIS
HARRIS
PEREZ-MARES
NILSSON
ASHEGHIAN
ASHEGHIAN
PIERCE
KONYAR
TORUNO
PIERCE
KONYAR
DULGEROFF
CHARKINS
NILSSON

Tentative 2011-2012 Schedule of Classes
Fall		
Econ 200
Econ 202
Econ 302
Econ 311
Econ 335
Econ 410
Econ 435
Econ 443
Econ 480
Econ 503
Econ 530
Econ 600
Ssci 320		
		

Winter		
Econ 104
Econ 200
Econ 202
Econ 300
Econ 311
Econ 311
Econ 322
Econ 333
Econ 357
Econ 430
Econ 445
Econ 475
Econ 540
Econ 573
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Spring
Econ 200
Econ 202
Econ 311
Econ 360
Econ 372
Econ 410
Econ 450
Econ 490
Econ 500

